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Abstract
This paper models the relationship between growth, technology-lifetime, entry, and competition
in a vintage-knowledge model of endogenous growth and perfect competition. The model has a
unique steady state REE equilibrium. Variations of R&D-e¢ ciency lead to a negative relation
between growth and vintage-lifetime and indicate a non-monotonic relation between growth and
competition. A shift of population size and its growth rates have qualitatively di⁄erent consequences
here than in standard models. The extent of entry constitutes a bu⁄er, neutralizing the e⁄ect of
population size or population growth rates on per-capita income levels and growth rates.
Keywords: Endogenous Growth, Vintage-Model, Perfect Competition
JEL: D40, D90, O30, O40
1 Introduction
This paper models the interaction between productivity growth, active lifetime of technology gener-
ations, entry, and competition in a vintage-knowledge model of perfect competition and endogenous
growth.
At unique steady-state rational expectation equilibrium, a variation of most exogenous parameters
induces an opposite reaction of productivity growth and active technology lifetime. Variations of these
parameters therefore induce a negative relation between productivity (and per capita income) growth
on the one hand and the active lifetime of technology vintages on the other hand. This prediction is
in accord with the observations of Habakkuk [1962], Williamson [1971], Pack [1986] or Hsieh [2001].
In contrast, there is no such clear cut relation between the intensity of competition and growth. In
numerical examples the relation is either positive or non-monotonic, which is compatible with cross-
sectional observations for instance by Nickel [1996], Blundell, Gri¢ th and VanReenen [1999] (who ￿nd
a positive empirical relation) and Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt [2005] (who ￿nd a
non-monotonic empirical relation).
1Furthermore, a shift of population size and its growth rates have qualitatively di⁄erent conse-
quences here than in standard endogenous growth models: The extent of entry constitutes a perfect
bu⁄er, completely neutralizing the e⁄ect of mere size on the steady state growth rate or the steady
state level of per capita income. This may help explain why, following Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and
Miller [2004], neither population size nor population growth rate are ￿signi￿cantly related to growth￿ .
Nevertheless, in contrast to the prediction of semi-endogenous growth models, policy can raise the
long-run per-capita growth rate by subsidizing R&D-activity. An increase of the population growth
rate has no permanent e⁄ect on the per-capita income growth rate, a negative e⁄ect on the level of
per-capita income, and a positive e⁄ect on the research intensity and its share in GDP. The present
model allows to explain why past per-capita growth rates have not increased despite a strong observed
increase in the resources spent on R&D (in contrast to the Romer-type endogenous growth models)
without giving up the possibility of perpetual growth even when these resources and population no
longer grow (in contrast to the Jones-type semi-endogenous growth models).
1.1 A vintage model of perfect competition and endogenous growth
There are only two levels of activity at the production-side of the economy:
1. the production of a homogenous ￿nal-consumption good by many small incumbent ￿rms, each
of which is characterized by a level of ￿knowledge-capital￿determining its labor productivity
and
2. the production of new knowledge-capital by many small reseach-labs (entrants) who can later use
their knowledge-capital as ￿nal-good incumbents. Building on past knowledge each individual
entrant has to produce his ￿own￿knowledge-capital. The quality of the knowledge-capital (futur
labor productivity in ￿nal-good production) depends in a deterministic way on the entrant￿ s
R&D-intensity.
There is perfect competition on both layers of the model:1 Assuming small e¢ cient scales for the
individual ￿nal-good ￿rm, competition on the goods market will naturally lead to perfect competi-
1The idea of a formal model of endogenous growth with perfect competition can already be found in Shell [1973].
The title ￿A competitive model in which inventive activity is ￿nanced from quasi-rents in advanced technology￿ of
Section IV of Shell￿ s article maps the road to endogenous growth taken in the present article. While Shell￿ s model is
partial equilibrium, Funk [1996] analyzes a general equilibrium model with perfect competition and endogenous growth
and provides conditions on the productivity of research that ensure the persistence of endogenous growth. As in the
present paper, these assumptions mimic those of Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpman [1991a,b] or Aghion and Howitt
[1992]: there has to be the right amount of positive spill-overs from research onto the productivity of further research.
Concerning the nature of competition and endogenous growth the present model is a representative consumer continuous-
time version with rational expectations of the discrete time OLG model in Funk [1996]. In contrast to the present paper,
2tion ￿ la Arrow-Debreu, all ￿rms (and consumers) will be assumed to be price takers. This does allow
￿rms to make strictly positive short-run pro￿ts (quasi-rents) justifying costly entrance with new or
rejuvenated technologies and hence is perfectly compatible with endogenous growth ￿provided that
instantaneous entry to the most up to date technologies is not completely free and provided that ￿
given past investment ￿individual ￿rms￿short-run technologies exhibit decreasing returns to scale.
An important feature of the present model is the endogenous determination of the active lifetime of
individual technology vintages. An incumbent ￿rm which has entered with a given technology in period
t remains active with this technology-vintage as long as it remains pro￿table. The less ￿rms enter in
subsequent periods with new improved knowledge, the longer the period of activity of the technology-
vintage t will be. As in other endogenous growth models the future short-run pro￿ts an entrant
anticipates provide the necessary incentive for his research. In most monopolisitcally competitive
endogenous growth models these pro￿ts arise due to a constant mark-up of prices over marginal costs.
Typically this mark-up is ￿xed exogenously: Either by the elasticity of substitution of the innovator￿ s
brand with other brands or ￿closer to the present setting ￿by the ￿xed quality-adjusted productivity
distance of the best to the second best ￿rm (limit-pricing in case of a non-drastic vertical process or
new knowledge in Funk [1996] can be imitated free of cost by the marked after an exogenously ￿xed number of periods.
The length of the period during which a technology-vintage can realize quasi-rents was thus not determined endogenously.
While in the present paper (as in Shell [1973], Funk [1996]) there are many small innovators in each period, there is
a single small innovator per period, whose achievements can be copied free of cost after one period in Funk [1998] (and
similarly in Funk [2002] or Funk and Vogel [2004]). Funk [1996,2002] also relate the perfectly competitive endogenous
growth models to those of Schumpeter￿ s early work (Schumpeter [1911] or ￿Schumpeter Mark I￿ in Scherer￿ s [1992]
terminology) as well as to the literature of induced change of the 60ies (Kennedy [1964], Samuelson [1965], Drandakis
and Phelps [1966]). For instance it is argued that the perfectly competitive model of endogenous growth best captures
Samuelson￿ s idea of ￿Darwinian perfect competition￿(Samuelson [1965], p. 351).
The present paper (and more so the aforementioned discrete time models with only one innovator, who can be copied
after one period) is also related to the theory by Boldrin and Levine [1999, 2002, 2004] who advocate a more rigorous
return to the competitive model. It is di¢ cult not to agree with these authors that nobody has ever used an idea which
was not embodied in some rival object or subject.
Hellwig and Irmen [2001] analyze a model with many small innovating ￿rms similar to the discrete time model of Funk
[1996]. New knowledge can already be freely copied after one period, so that the vintage of one technology generation
is exogenously ￿xed to one. In Hellwig and Irmen [2001] each ￿rm chooses the e¢ cient scale of inputs (￿ capacity￿ ) of
the next period￿ s small ￿nal good technology generated by the innovation as well as the productivity at these scales. In
contrast, in the present setting the e¢ cient scale of the chosen individual technology is ￿xed exogenously.
In contrast to Shell [1973], Funk [1996,1998,2002], Hellwig and Irmen [2001] or Funk and Vogel [2004]), the active
lifetime of individual technology vintages is determined endogenously here. Finally the present model is related to W￿lde
[2004], who uses a perfectly competitive model of endogenous growth to study the possibility and the determinants of
cyclical behavior of R&D-investment. In contrast to the present paper ￿where the ￿nite lifetime of technology vintages
is determined endogenously ￿old knowledge (embodied in old machines) never becomes obsolete.
3product innovation). Short-run pro￿ts in the present setting arise in a similar way as these constant
mark-up pro￿ts due to limit-pricing. However, the limit-￿rm is not the second best ￿rm but rather
the endogenously determined oldest active incumbent. As a consequence
1. the mark-up for any given incumbent j is determined endogenously by the productivity-
distance between j and the oldest active incumbent as well as by the active technology lifetime
which determines who is the oldest active incumbent
2. the mark-up for any given incumbent j is not constant, because the productivity-distance
between j and the currently oldest active incumbent shrinks in each period (until j becomes the
oldest current ￿rm himself before being driven out of business).
Although there is no scope for collusion and there are no stratigic consideration involved in the
present perfectly competitive framework, the knowledge asymmetry between small incumbent ￿rms
makes it useful to talk about more intense or less intense (perfect) competition. This corresponds
to colloquial usage of the term2 and is also captured by standard measures of competition based on
price-costs margins. I will therefore speak of high (low) intensity of competition when there are many
(few) incumbent ￿rms close to the current frontier of knowledge and use a standard measure of the
intensity of competition which captures this idea.3
In the vintage-knowledge model the intensity of (perfect) competition thus depends on the dis-
tribution of incumbent ￿rms over ￿ knowledge-capital￿of di⁄erent vintages, which in turn depends on
how many ￿rms have invested in knowledge-capital in the past. The more ￿rms have access to recent
and correspondingly more modern techniques, the more ￿nal output Yt a given number of workers
LY t can produce, the ￿ercer is competition and the smaller are pro￿ts at (short-run) equilibrium.
The highest possible intensity of competition is attained when the (short-run) aggregate technology
exhibits constant returns to scale and short-run pro￿ts are zero, which would be the case if there were
free entry to the most advanced technical knowledge. I call this limit case ￿which does not occur at
equilibrium ￿the case of complete competition. In other words, complete competition would be
achieved in the limit where all knowledge would be available publicly and could be copied and applied
without cost and without delay. Only this limit case would result in a linear-homogeneous short-run
aggregate production-function. Correspondingly, only in this limit case, there would be no incentive to
2In a 100 m race, an exam at graduate school, a beauty or music contest one says that competition is intense when
there are many almost equally fast, learned, beautiful or skilled contenders (even if strategic considerations play no role).
3To ￿x attention I will follow Aghion et al. [2005] and measure the intensity of competition by a weighted sum







outputj . The simpler measure 1 ￿
total pro￿t
total output would yield similar steady state dependencies of
competition on growth and technology lifetime.
4spend costly resources for R&D to enter the market with new knowledge-capital, so that there would
be no (endogenous) technical change (see Romer [1990]).
Figure 1.1 shows two examples of short-run aggregate production functions (as functions of
labor input). They are strictly concave since reducing employment LY t drives out of business the least
productive ￿rms ￿rst. If many ￿rms know the latest technology, the short-run aggregate production
function is nearly linear on a fairly large domain. Vintage lifetimes are short, competition on the ￿nal
good market is ￿erce, (perfectly competitive) pro￿ts are small. The current incentive for new ￿rms
to enter will be weak. If in contrast, relatively few ￿rms use the latest technologies (have recently
entered), then the short-run aggregate production function exhibits rather strong decreasing returns
to scale. Competition is moderate, pro￿ts are high. The current incentive to enter the market with
new knowledge-capital will be strong. See ￿gure 1.1A and 1.1B for two economies with same current
employment LY t and the same currently leading technology At but di⁄erent degrees of competition.
More ￿rms use technologies that are almost as e¢ cient as At in economy A than in economy B.
Correspondingly production is higher in A, while (perfectly competitive) pro￿ts are higher in B.
LY LYt
Yt
A L t Yt
A L t
Y L t Y b g
p t t w /
12 4 3 4
A: strong competition, high output, small profits
LY LYt
Yt
A L t Yt
A L t
Y L t Y b g
p t t w /
1 2 44 4 3 444
B: weak competition, low output, large profits
The perfectly competitive endogenous growth framework rests on two crucial assumption: First,
an individual research lab passes on its research to only one ￿nal-output ￿rm. While old knowledge
can be cheaply copied, more own e⁄ort has to be invested to get close to the frontier of knowledge or
even improve upon it. Technical change therefore comes along with a lot of duplication of research
e⁄ort. Second, the individual ￿nal good ￿rm has small e¢ cient scales relative to aggregate resource
supply. Similar restrictions both of the public replicability of individual knowledge as well as of
the individual replicability of small e¢ cient scales are typically required to justify the assumption of
perfect competition in any general equilibrium framework (For a microeconomic foundation of the of
the aggregate short-run production and short-run Walrasian competition in the present framework see
5for instance Novshek and Sonnenschein [1980]).
Relation to previous vintage-capital models of endogenous growth Many of the leading
growth theorists of the 1960ies have described growth within models of vintage-capital and -knowledge.
Among others they were interested in the relation between growth rates and the endogenous active
lifespan of technology generations (see for instance Solow [1962], Phelps [1963], Solow, Tobin, von
Weizs￿cker, and Yaari [1966]). While these models assumed competitive markets as does the present
paper, technical change was of course exogenous. Exogenous technical progress raises wages, reducing
the short-run pro￿ts that can be realized by incumbent technologies of older vintages until they are
scrapped. A similar ￿in￿ ationary wage scheme￿determines the active lifespan of technologies and the
age structure of active technologies in the present paper, except that the rate of technical progress
in￿ ating wages is endogenous too.
Although the simultaneous activity of machines and technics of di⁄erent ages is an obvious fact,
only the latest technology vintage is active in most post-1960 (exogenous or endogenous) growth
models. The reason for this narrowing of scope lies in the technical di¢ culties of vintage models. The
present paper avoids most of these di¢ culties by restricting itself to steady state equilibria. Motivated
by the omnipresence of heterogenous vintage structures in reality and the inconsistencies of non-vintage
growth theory with aggregate data (see Cooley, Greenwood, and Yorukoglu [1994]) research in vintage
models has recently been resumed (see for instance Benhabib and Rustichini [1991], Caballero and
Hammour [1996], Bardhan and Priale [1996], Boucekkine, Germain, Licandro, and Magnus [1998],
Boucekkine, del Rio, and Licandro [1999], Hsieh [2001]). A common issue of this literature is the
possibility of endogenous ￿ uctuations that arises naturally at non-steady state equilibria of vintage
models. Boucekkine, Licandro, and Paul [1997] as well as Boucekkine, Licandro, Puch and Paul [2005]
provide numerical methods to solve vintage models, which may allow to study the o⁄ steady-state
equilibrium behavior of the present model.
1.2 Intuition and summary of results
Steady-state mechanics with constant population and constant aggregate research inten-
sity: Positive mechanical relation between actve lifetime and growth; Negative mechan-
ical relation between competition and growth . The present paper only studies steady-state
equilibria. To get a ￿rst idea of the mechanical relation between active lifetime and growth and be-
tween competition and growth which will be formally described in Section 3 ￿rst consider Figure 1
depicting an economy with constant population L in which the number LY of workers in ￿nal-good
production and the number LA of workers in R&D (￿researchers￿ ) are exogenously given such that
6the overall research intensity lA = LA=L, with L = LA + LY of the economy is constant. The LA
researchers are assigned to ￿ research labs (or research ￿rms), so that each individual research lab
employs h = LA=￿ researchers. As each research lab is associated with exactly one ￿nal-good pro-
ducer the number of research ￿rms ￿ also determines the extent of entry to ￿nal-good production by
new ore rejuvenated ￿rms. Consider a steady state with common and constant individual research
intensity h. Obviously ￿given overall research intensity lA ￿there is an immediate trade-o⁄ between
high individual research intensity h and a high extent of entry ￿ = LA=h. To see how this translates
L
AA lLL ￿=
Y YA lLL LL ￿= =-
h








Figure 1: Research, extent of entry and technology-lifespan with constant population
into a trade-o⁄ between growth and competition consider what happens when h is raised. On the one
hand, the common individual research intensity h of each individual research-lab uniquely determines
the intensity of the steady state productivity growth rate g = f(h). An increase of h therefore raises
productivity growth g what in turn raises growth of per-capita income and consumption. On the other
hand increasing h a⁄ects the intensity of competition (measured by the share 1 ￿ ￿=Y of non-pro￿t
incomes from ￿nal-good production or by the Lerner-Index) through two channels:
(1) First, given total research LA an increase of the individual research intensity h reduces the number
￿ = LA=h of research labs and thus the extent of entry in each period. Since the total number
LY of workers in the ￿nal-good sector as well as the optimal scale of input of each individual
producer are given, a smaller number ￿ of ￿rms of each vintage will result in a larger lifetime T
of each vintage (see Figure 1). This increases the ratio of the productivity of younger technology-
vintages to the productivity of the oldest active vintage. Since the productivity of the oldest
active vintage determines ￿nal-good sector wages, the increased active lifespan reduces the ￿wage
in￿ ation￿inherent in the ￿obsolesence mechanism￿ . As a result the short-run pro￿ts of active
￿rms as well as the ratio ￿=Y of total pro￿ts to output (or a weighted sum of individual pro￿t-
shares) are increased by the increase of h and the corresponding reduction of ￿.
(2) Second, given the active lifetime T of technology vintages, the increasing productivity growth
g (caused by an increase of h) raises the ratio of the productivity of any active vintage to
7the productivity of the oldest active vintage. This too increases the share of pro￿ts in total
production.
Given LA and LY , an increase of h thus increases the productivity growth rate g and reduces the
intensity of competition by the two mechanism described in (1) and (2): Less entry means that for each
knowledge-vintage fewer customers can be served by ￿nal-good producers with better technologies.
The reduction of the wage in￿ ation caused by ￿obsolescence mechanism￿of creative destruction caused
both directly by an increasing g as well as indirectly by the induced increase of T raises the ratio of
(short run) pro￿ts to production.
Adding population growth The population size need not be constant for the presence of the
described trade-o⁄. Let Lt grow at the constant rate n and assume that both industrial employment
LY t and research LAt grow proportionally so that as before the overall research intensity lA = LAt=Lt
remains constant. At steady state the research intensity h of the individual research lab will still
be constant, such that the number of research labs and the extent of entry ￿t grows at the pace of
populating growth and the per-capita extent of entry ￿ = ￿t=Lt remains constant. As before the
immediate trade-o⁄ between h and ￿ translates into one between competition and growth. However,
the steady state lifetime T of technology-vintages will now depend on the rate n of population growth.
Without population growth total employment LY is T￿￿, that is the number of active vintages T
times the number ￿ of ￿rms per vintage times the number ￿ of workers per ￿rm. The steady state
lifetime T = LY =￿￿ = (h=￿)￿(LY =LA) thus is proportional to the individual research intensity. With
positive population growth a slightly more complex but similar mechanical relation between T, h and
LAt=LY t will hold: Given LAt=LY t, the active lifetime T increases with individual research intensity h
as well as with the population growth rate n. The reason is simple: The faster population grows, the
smaller the ratio of a given number of ￿rms ￿￿ of any incumbent vintage ￿ < t to current employment
Lt.
Equal marginal present values from increasing the induvidual R&D-intensity and increas-
ing the extend of entry: Negative relation between active lifetime and growth Apart from
these mechanical conditions the usual Euler-equation for optimal consumption growth has to be sat-
is￿ed and there are two crucial equilibrium conditions from the research and production side of the
economy: ￿rstly individual research intensity h should maximize the present value of future quasi-rents
generated by a research lab minus the cost or research and secondly these di⁄erence should be zero
(free-entry to research). The ￿rst condition will require that the marginal present value (MPV) from
increasing h equals the research wage and the second condition can be interpreted as requiring that
8MPV from increasing the rate of entry ￿ equals the research wage. In Section 4 it will be shown that
the di⁄erence between the MPV of ￿ and the MPV of h increases both in the productivity growth
rate g and in the technology lifespan T. This provides a negative relation beween the g and T.
Existence and uniqueness of balanced growth equilibrium when the total research in-
tensity is exogenous As has been explained, the mechanical steady state relations of Section 3
provide a positve relation between g and T. Equalizing the MPV from increasing h and ￿ in Section
4 yields a negative relation between g and T. Section 5 puts together the two relations between g
and T and shows that they uniquely determine productivity and income growth rate, the individual
research intensity, the active life-time of each technology-vintage as well as the extent of entry. An
exogenous variation of total R&D-intensity, of a research-e¢ ciency parameter, of impatience or of the
population growth rate each e⁄ects g and T in opposite directions. An empirical dispersion of any of
these parameters thus leads to a negative relation between growth and active lifetime of technology
vintages.
Endogenous total research intensity. Adding the trade-o⁄ between consumption and
R&D investment: Positive relation between active lifetime and growth Now assume that
￿nal-good production and research are no longer ￿xed exogenously. The two sectors use the same
input L, which now will be endogenously allocated to industrial production and research. This adds
the usual endogenous growth trade-o⁄ between current consumption (determined by LY ) and total
research LA to the above trade-o⁄. On the one hand there now is an additional variable that has
to be determined endogenously (total R&D-intensity lA = LA=L). On the other hand there is an
additional equilibrium condition requiring that research wages correspond to the wages in ￿nal-good
production. This condition leads to a positve relation between lifetime T and gowth g. The e⁄ect
is similar to the positive growth e⁄ect of an increase of the mark-up over marginal costs in standard
monopolistically competitive models: Consider Figure 1.1 on page 5: Larger T (given g) means lower
intensity of competition, higher pro￿ts, higher incentives to innovate and higher g.
In Section 6 it is shown that this positive relation between g and T (￿equal wages") together
with the negative realtion of Section 4 (￿equal MVP") provides a unique steady state equilibrium
determining g and T independently from the "mechanical steady-state" relation of Section 3. The
latter relation is used to determine the now endogenous total R&D-intensity. At this unique steady
state equilibrium, the shares in total resources devoted to ￿nal-good production and to research as well
as the (per capita) number of innovators and the degree to which innovations improve over incumbent
technologies are constant. The research e¢ ciency parameters as well as the degree of consumers￿
patience have the usual positive e⁄ect on steady state income growth rates. In contrast, a shift of
9population size and its growth rates have qualitatively di⁄erent consequences here than in previous
endogenous growth models. The following paragraphs therefore discuss this in more detail.
The e⁄ect of population size: Complete absence of scale e⁄ects For the case without
population growth it is immediately seen from Figure 1 that an increase of L may remain without
e⁄ect on the growth rate g = f(h) and the lifespan T, if it neither a⁄ects the total research intensity
lA nor the individual research intensity h. This would be the case if at equilibrium the extent of entry
￿ would vary proportionally with L: This is exactly what happens in the present framework. At the
heart of the di⁄erences in the predictions of the e⁄ects of populations size lies the observation that the
two crucial equilibrium conditions (optimal individual research intensity and free entry to research)
do not (directly) depend on the total size of the economy. The individual research intensity and the
expected new technology￿ s lifetime satisfying these two conditions only depend on interest rates, on
current research wages, and on future ￿nal-good sector wages. The reason for the independence from
total population size are those assumptions which also justify the framework of perfect competition:
￿rst, the e¢ cient scale size of the individual ￿nal-good producer does not depend on the size of the
market, and second, each individual ￿nal-good producer has to perform its own additional research to
reach or improve upon the current knowledge frontier.
In the model with one type of labor for both sectors, current research wages equal current ￿nal-
good sector wages. At steady state the latter will be shown to grow as usual at the rate of productivity
growth. Furthermore current wages are determined by the productivity of the oldest currently active
technology vintage, which in turn only depends on productivity growth rate g and lifetime T (at
steady state). Finally, the common individual research intensity determines steady state productivity
growth g. Thus, given the interest rate, the two equilibrium condition for individual research ￿rms can
be reduced to two conditions only involving technology vintage-lifetime T and productivity growth g
(which will be shown to have a unique solution). Since the two conditions are independent of the size
of the economy, the growth rate too will be independent of the size of the economy!
As a consequence, an increase of total resources increases the steady state extent of entry without
a⁄ecting the growth rate or per capita incomes. Thus, the extent of entry is higher in a large country
than in a small country. Not so the growth rate or the per-capita income level. In other words, in the
present paper the extent of entry constitutes a perfect bu⁄er, completely neutralizing the
e⁄ect of mere size on the steady state growth rate or the steady state level of per capita
income.
This conclusion distinguishes the vintage-knowledge perfectly competitive model ￿ to di⁄erent
degrees ￿from monopolistically competitive endogenous growth models. In an overview article on the
recent growth theory Charles Jones notes that ￿virtually all idea-based growth models involve some
10kind of scale e⁄ect. [Jones 2003, p. 55]￿and that ￿ ...this result is not surprising given that these
are idea-based growth models, but it is useful to recognize since many of the papers in this literature
have titles that include the phrase ￿ growth without scale e⁄ects￿ ... [p. 46 ]￿ . Jones even holds that
the presence of
￿... [S]cale e⁄ect is so inextricably tied to idea-based growth models that rejecting one is
largely equivalent to rejecting the other [Jones 2003, p. 38]￿ .
The present paper shows that this claim does not extend to the present setting. Growth in this
paper is certainly driven by the accumulation of ideas. The essential feature leading to perpetual
and endogenous growth is a su¢ ciently strong externality from the current stock of ideas onto the
productivity of further research for new ideas, exactly as in previous endogenous growth models. Yet,
endogenous growth in the present idea-based model is completely disentangled from size e⁄ects.
The e⁄ect of population growth: No growth e⁄ect, negative level e⁄ect, positive e⁄ect
on research intensity. While the level of population has no e⁄ect on steady state income growth
rates and levels, the same is not true for the population growth rate. As in the standard Solow-model
an increase of population growth reduces the steady state level of per capita income.
As has been mentioned, given total research intensity lA = LA=L and the growth rate of knowledge
g, an increase of population growth increases the active lifetime T of a knowledge-capital vintage.
This in turn has a negative e⁄ect on knowledge and income growth. Thus, if the total research
intensity LA=L is exogenously held constant as in Section 5, population growth has a negative e⁄ect
on income growth. However, for the reasons sketched above, in the complete model of Section 6 with
endogenous research intensity lA, productivity and per-capita income growth rates are determined by
the two individual research lab￿ s equilibrium conditions. Thus total research intensity lA = LA=L
will endogenously rise after an increase of population growth, exactly neutralizing the negative direct
e⁄ect of population growth on per capita income growth. Not only the level of population but also its
growth rate has no growth e⁄ect! This prediction too contradicts those of most previous endogenous
growth models.
It is also shown that despite the absence of scale e⁄ects, the present model is a model of endogenous
growth not only in the sense that growth occurs due to pro￿t-seeking R&D, but also in the sense that
the growth rate can be a⁄ected by public policy. An R&D subsidy (￿nanced by a lump-sum tax)
increases the steady state income growth rate.
Constant growth rates despite increasing research intensity and increasing research-share
The research intensity and hence also the share of incomes from research in total incomes increase
11with rising population growth rate without a⁄ecting per-capita income-growth. This result allows to
reconcile two stylized facts within an endogenous growth model that can generate perpetually balanced
growth without depending on perpetual population growth: the increasing aggregate research intensity
observed in recent decades with the more or less constant productivity and per-capita income growth
rates (See Sections 7 and 8).
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the vintage model of perfect
competition and of endogenous growth and de￿nes steady states. Section 3 discusses some basic
properties of steady state equilibrium. Section 4 derives two essential equilibrium conditions. In
Section 5 steady state equilibrium is ￿rst analyzed assuming an exogenously ￿xed total research
intensity. Given the fraction of total resources dedicated to innovative investment, it remains to
determine how many innovators enter (and how many ￿rms upgrade their technology) and how drastic
their innovations are. It is shown that there always exists a unique steady state equilibrium and
comparative statics are studied. Assuming that workers can choose whether to work in the ￿nal-good
sector or in the research sector, Section 6 adds the second endogenous growth dimension, usually
modelled in endogenous growth models. Existence and uniqueness of steady state equilibrium are
shown as well as all the aforementioned comparative static results: the absence of level and growth
e⁄ects of the population size, the absence of a growth e⁄ect of population growth rate despite its
positive e⁄ect on the research intensity, the negative level e⁄ect of population growth, and the potential
growth e⁄ect of public policy. Sections 7 and 8 conclude by comparing the scale e⁄ects of the present
model with those of previous endogenous growth models and with recent stylized facts.
2 The model
2.1 Final-good production
At period t 2 <+ a ￿nal-good producer of type ￿ 2 (￿1;t] is characterized by the number A￿ of output
units he can produce with the e¢ cient-scale amount of labor. A￿ is ￿￿ s knowledge-capital arising from
past innovative investment which will be described below.4 His type will later be identi￿ed with the
time he ￿rst entered the market or last up-dated his knowledge-capital, which I call his vintage. In
the basic version of the model I normalize his short-run technology such that he uses exactly one unit
4This ￿ knowledge-capital￿can either be intangible abstract knowledge that has been generated in the past and can be
used by ￿ (as in most endogenous growth theory) or it can be interpreted as physical capital owned by ￿ that has been
produced in the past and that embodies a corresponding state of knowledge (as in Boldrin and Levine [2002]).
12of labor (if he decides to be active).5 At t the index of the most recent technology is ￿ = t.
The total number (mass) of small ￿nal good-producers of type ￿ is ￿￿. The ￿nal good sector
at t is completely described by the range [A￿1;At] of known technologies at t and the distribution
f￿￿g￿2[￿1;t] of incumbents over this range. I denote by ￿(t) the vintage of the oldest technology still
in use at t, which needs of course to be determined endogenously. Tt := t ￿ ￿(t) then is the active
lifetime of this technology.
There is perfect competition on the ￿nal good-market among all existing ￿rms of all types at t;
so that only the best and most recent technologies will be active (those of vintage ￿(t) or younger).










The intensity of (perfect) competition on the ￿nal good market depends on the present distribution
f￿￿g￿2[￿1;t] of incumbents over known technologies. If many ￿rms know the latest technology (have
recently entered, Tt = t ￿ ￿(t) small), the short-run aggregate production function (as a function of
labor input) is nearly linear on a fairly large domain. Return to ￿gure 1.1A and 1.1B which show
two economies with same the LY t and the same leading technology At but di⁄erent intensities of
competition.
A microeconomic foundation of the aggregate short-run production function ￿tting into the present
setting is given in Novshek and Sonnenschein [1980] in a Cournot-Walras framework. A similar
foundation can be given in the Bertrand-Walras setting of Funk [1995].
2.2 Innovation
The knowledge-capital production function On the basis of already known technologies, re-
search lab j can develop new technologies. The extent of the improvement over known technologies
5Note that the crucial assumption allowing a sound micro-foundation of the perfect competition assumed her is that
individual ￿rms￿technologies have e¢ cient scales at which the input amounts are small relative to the total supply of
these inputs. This is also the essential assumption behind the absence of scale-e⁄ects. To simplify the exposition I
normalize this e¢ cient scale input to one unit of labor. Later I show that this is in fact a normalization which has
no e⁄ect on the results. The simplest way to guarantee that an active individual producer will in fact employ exactly
one unit of labor is to assume that an individual technology ￿ produces no output with less than one unit of labor and
produces A￿ units of output with at least one unit of labor. Note that while this extreme form of decreasing returns
to scale simpli￿es the exposition, it is neither necessary for the perfect competition assumed here (see in Novshek and
Sonnenschein [1980]) nor for the absence of scale e⁄ects.
13depends on the basis of knowledge accessible to research ￿rm j and on the amount hjt of labor em-
ployed by j. A research lab employing hjt units of labor at t comes up (with certaninty) with a
technology with productivity




where A￿ is the productivity of the leading technology at ￿.
Thus, slightly deviating from the language used in much of the new growth literature, R&D ￿rms
do not ￿ create a number _ At of new designs￿or products, but rather come up with new or known
technologies for producing the ￿nal good output and parametrized by their productivity Ajt. Note
that at equilibrium all research ￿rms at t will chose the same number of researchers ht and therefore
generate the same technology At = f(ht)
R t
￿1 A￿d￿. Hence at a steady state equilibrium (with constant
ht)
_ At = f(ht)
Z t
￿1
_ A￿d￿ = f(ht)At, (2)
which is equivalent to the more standard expression for R&D production functions: If ht = h is
constant, then the growth rate of labor productivity g = _ At=At = f(h) is constant as well. The
scale elasticity of At in knowledge-capital production is therefore one, as in ￿rst generation and the
￿ generation 98￿endogenous growth models.







with a;￿;￿ > 0. The relevant features of f are that it is increasing (f0(h) > 0) with positive and
declining elasticity: "(g) := f0(h)h=f(h) > 0 and
d"(g)
dg ￿ 0.6 These features are indeed satis￿ed for the
example function: For h ￿ 0, f is increasing with f(h) 2 [0;1) . The elasticity "(g) := f0(h)h=f(h) at
h = f￿1(g) is "(g) = ￿￿(1 ￿ g1=￿). It decreases with rising g: d"(g)=dg = ￿￿g(1￿￿)=￿ < 0 if g > 0.
The objective of research ￿rms Each individual research lab succeeds with its envisaged pro-
duction of knowledge-capital. After innovation research lab j with knowledge-capital Ajt turns into a
￿nal good producer using the new know-ledge capital to produce Ajt units of output with one unit of
6For most results it would be su¢ cient to assume f(h) increasing (f
0(h) > 0) at a declining rate (f
00 < 0), as is for
instance satis￿ed by the function f(h) = ah
￿, with a;￿ > 0 and ￿ < 1. While for a research production function like
f(h) = ah
￿, the marginal productivity of research declines with increasing e⁄ort, the momentaneous productivity growth
rate f(h) = ah
￿ resulting from the research of an individual research unit is in principle unbounded (provided research
input where unbounded), which seems rather implausible. The elasticity of f with respect to h is constant ￿ > 0: A one
percent increase of research h increase always result in a ￿ percent increase of productivity growth f(g). It seems to be
more realistic to assume that the momentaneous productivity growth rate is bounded, so that for already high research
intensity the elasticity of f(h) declines with increasing h (this plays a role mainly when considering optimal growth).
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Figure 2: R&D production function
labor.7 Research lab j at t thus chooses the number of researchers hj to maximize the excess of this





[Aj ￿ wY ￿]e￿r(￿￿t)d￿ ￿ wAthj;
where T(hj) is the length of time the ￿rm plans to be active on the good market and where we have
already assumed that interest rates are constant.
There is free entry to research. This will make sure that at equilibrium the revenues generated
by one research lab just cover research wages wAthjt: Since each research lab turns into exactly
on ￿nal-good ￿rm, the number ￿t of research labs at t determines the extent of entry by new (or
rejuvenated) ￿rms into the ￿nal-good market. At equilibrium all research labs at t will chose the
same knowledge-capital At, so that ￿t determines the number of future ￿nal-good competitors with
common knowledge-capital At.
If there are ￿t research labs at t, each employing ht workers, then total labor demand of the research
sector is ￿tht = LAt. Thus, while ￿t measures the extent of entry, ht determines the productivity of
entering ￿rms. Together ￿t and ht will determine the curvature of future ￿nal good technologies and
hence the future intensity of competition and of pro￿ts. An increase of total R&D activity LAt does
not automatically enhance productivity growth of the leading ￿nal good technology. It may merely
increase the extent of entry.
Once more, note that each research lab turns into a single ￿nal-good ￿rm only. It cannot for
instance licence the same knowledge-capital to several ￿nal-good producers at the same time. A
￿rm which considers to enter the market for ￿nal-goods or to upgrade its technology has to perform
some research on its own (or to let it done by a down-stream research lab), even if competitors are
7Alternatively each research lab sells the exclusive rights to use its innovation to a single ￿nal good producer. Com-
petition for these rights will ensure that their market-values correspond to the present value of the expected ￿ ow of
quasi-pro￿ts generated by the corresponding ￿nal good producer.
15developing similar technics. This re￿ ects the rival part of knowledge which takes into account that to
some extent ideas are always embodied in human or physical capital. Nevertheless knowledge keeps its
partially public good character: When trying to enter the market or upgrade its knowledge a ￿nal-good
producer (or its downstream research lab) can built on all knowledge which has been introduced by
previous innovators (the term
R t
￿1 A￿d￿ in (2)). It has however to add some proper e⁄ort (hjt in (2))
￿not necessarily much, if he contents himself with a rather old-fashioned technology and, depending
on the shape of f(￿), much more if he wants to come up with an up to date or even leading technology.
2.3 Households
The household sector is modeled as in the standard Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model. The representa-
tive household has the dynastic utility function
Z 1
t=0
e￿￿tu(ct)Ltdt with u(ct) = lnct
where ct = Ct=Lt is the per capita consumption of the household at t and Lt the number of household
members.
Total population and labor-supply Lt grows at an exogenous rate n :=
dLt=dt
Lt ￿ 0. Of the Lt
workers LY t are employed in the ￿nal good sector at wage wY t, while LAt = Lt ￿ LY t are employed
in the research sector at wage wAt. At present I leave open whether there are two distinct types of
workers, with ￿xed exogenous research intensity z := LAt=LY t, or whether all workers are identical and
freely choose in which sector to work. In the former case (Section 5) total industrial employment and
total R&D activity are exogenously predetermined and the two wages wY t and wAt will typically di⁄er
at equilibrium. In the latter case (Section 6) the allocation of labor to the two sectors is determined
endogenously such as to equalize the two wages.
Households own the existing ￿nal good ￿rms and can acquire shares of new ￿nal good ￿rms on
the equity market from successful research ￿rms. At each instant they receive the short-run pro￿ts of
￿nal good ￿rms corresponding to their shares. (Households also own research labs. However, as there
is free entry to research, shares in research ￿rms will pay no dividend and will have zero price).
Final good producer assets are priced at their fundamental value, i.e. at the present value of
the corresponding ￿ ow of future pro￿ts evaluated at market interest rates. Under these conditions,
a necessary condition of utility maximization given the sequence of interest rates rt is the standard
Euler-equation _ ct=ct = rt ￿ ￿.
162.4 Steady State Equilibrium
At each instant of time ￿nal good ￿rms maximize instantaneous pro￿ts, taking factor prices (wY t; wAt;
and rt) and output price (normalized to 1) as given. Each active research lab j chooses its research
input hjt such as to maximize the di⁄erence between the value of the ￿nal good ￿rms￿shares they
generate and the cost of research. There is an in￿nite number of potential research ￿rms, which are
indi⁄erent between becoming active or not, when pro￿ts are zero (Free Entry to Research). Households
maximize dynastic utility within their ￿nancial means, taking as given initial asset holdings and the
correctly foreseen sequence of wages and interests. A perfectly competitive equilibrium given an
initial distribution of ￿rms over known A￿(0), A0, f￿￿g￿2[￿(0);0] is de￿ned as a sequence of prices (wY t;
wAt; and rt) and of quantities (ht, LAt, LY t, Yt, Ct, At, ￿t, Tt) such that under the listed assumptions
the markets for labor, ￿nal goods, and shares clear at any instant.
A steady state equilibrium is an equilibrium at which rt, ht, lAt := LAt=Lt; lY t := LY t=Lt;
￿t = ￿t=Lt, and Tt are constant and wY t; wAt; yt := Yt=Lt; ct := Ct=Lt; and At grow exponentially at
the same constant rate g.
3 Mechanical steady-state relations
This section describes some steady-state relations between the growth rate g of the economy, the
active lifetime of a technology vintage T, the per-capita extent of entry ￿, and the per capita amount
of resources lY := LY t=Lt and lA := LAt=Lt allocated to the two sectors. Nothing is said here about
any causality in these relations, as most of the mentioned variables are endogenous (In Section 5 all of
these variables except LAt and LY t are endogenous and in Section 6, also lY := LY t=Lt, lA := LAt=Lt
or z = LAt=LY t will be determined endogenously).
Throughout the paper we will deal with present values
R T
0 e￿x￿d￿ of a unit-output stream over the
interval [0;T], where the constant discount rate x will be the productivity growth rate, the population









x if x 6= 0
T if x = 0
Notation
By de￿nition at steady state the per-capita amounts of resources allocated to ￿nal-good production
and to research lY and lA = 1￿lY as well as the productivity growth rate g are constant. Let lA and
g be given. I ￿rst show how the other constant steady state variables can be mechanically derived
without considering the equilibrium behavior of the R&D sector.
As has already been remarked, at steady state _ At = f(h)
R t
￿1
_ A￿d￿ = f(h)At and thus g :=
_ At=At = f(h). Thus the R&D production function f(￿) de￿nes a one to one relation between h
17and the productivity growth rate g 2 [0;1], the number of workers needed to generate a given g is






with ￿ = 1=￿; ￿ = 1=￿, and b = (1=a)￿. Of course h is constant if g is.
Now consider employment in the R&D sector. Since h is the number of workers employed by an
individual research lab and ￿ = ￿t=Lt, the per-capita number of research labs at t, an immediate
relation between lA, the total per-capita employment in R&D, and ￿ is given by
lA = ￿ ￿ h(g). (4)
Thus for our given lA = 1￿lY and g, the constant per-capita extent of entry ￿ = lA=h(g) is determined
as well. In fact the relation g = f(lA
￿ ) de￿nes a simple steady-state trade-O⁄ between entry and
growth:Next consider employment in the ￿nal-good sector. Each active ￿nal-output ￿rm employs
g
l
Figure 3: Trade-O⁄ between Entry and Growth: g = f(lA
￿ )
one unit of labor. Thus per-capita employment by ￿rms of vintage ￿ 2 [￿(t);t] is ￿ = ￿￿=L￿, the per-
capita number of ￿rms that have entered at ￿. Therefore per-capita employment at t in manufacturing










Lt d￿ = ￿
R t
t￿Tt e￿n(t￿￿)d￿ or
lY = ￿ ￿ I(n;T). (5)
For n = 0 steady state per-capita industrial employment simply is the per-capita number of ￿rms￿
per vintage multiplied by the number of active vintages: lY = ￿T. Equation (5) can be rewritten as
T = [￿ln(1 ￿ lY ￿n
￿ )]=n if n 6= 0 and T = lY =￿ if n = 0.
Dividing (4) by (5) yields for the ratio of researchers to industrial labor z := lA=lY = h(g)=I(n;T),
or h(g) = z ￿I(n;T). This relation de￿nes a straightforward stationary state relation between produc-
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Figure 4: Steady-State Relation between Growth and Vintage Lifetime




















Therefore Yt grows at the rate g + n of the number LtAt of labor e¢ ciency units. Consumption and
output per labor e¢ ciency unit is
Yt
AtLt
= ￿I(g + n;T) (7)
Thus, as in the Solow-model, given g, T, and ￿, the population size Lt of the economy has no impact
on the level of per-capita steady-state incomes, while the population growth rate n has a negative
e⁄ect on these incomes.
Inserting LY t = ￿LtI(n;T) into (7), the equation Yt
At =
I(g+n;T)
I(n;T) LY t describes the long-run steady
state relation between industrial employment and income levels.















n = 0. Once more consider an economy at steady state with constant population (n = 0): The constant active lifetime
of each knowledge-vintage equals the number of employees per research lab multiplied by the ratio of total employment
in R&D to employment in manufacturing.
19The short-run relation between LY t and Yt exhibits the usual properties of a short-run neo-
classical production function (see ￿gure 1.1): Short-run aggregate production is a strictly con-
cave and increasing function of labor. Assuming constant past ￿ and g this function is Yt(LY ) =
￿LtAt
1￿e￿(g+n)T(LY t)





for LY ￿ ￿L=n and Y (LY ) = ￿LAt
1￿e￿gLY =￿L
g if n = 0. The marginal product of labor therefore is
dYt(LY t)








dLY = Ate￿gT = A￿(t). At competitive equilibrium ￿nal good sector employees are paid at their




Thus ￿nal good sector wages too grow at the rate of productivity growth. Since yt grows at the rate g,
per capita consumption ct = yt also grows at the rate g. Finally, since g = _ ct=ct = rt ￿ ￿ is constant,
the interest rate rt = g + ￿ is constant too.
Summarizing, ￿xing the employment ratio z = lA=lY and the productivity growth rate g < f(z=n)
also determines constant levels for the variables lA; lY , h, ￿, T, yt=At, ct=At, wY t=At and r.
We can now describe the trade-o⁄ between growth and competition sketched on page 7 of
the Introduction in a more precise way (now also allowing n > 0): Given lA and lY = 1 ￿ lA (hence
given z = lA=lY ) the growth rate g can only be raised by raising T well via (the inverse of) Equation
6. Both the increase in g and in T lower the intensity of competition de￿ned by the weighted sum of
shares of non-pro￿t incomes from production 9














Note that this measure of competition is indeed closely linked to (the inverse of) the mark-up egT




T = I(gT;1) =
R 1
0 e￿(gT)￿d￿.
4 Optimal individual R&D-intensity and free-entry
The two fundamental equilibrium conditions arising from optimal individual research intensity and free
entry to research can be derived without further specifying the model. They hold both for exogenous
and for endogenous research intensity lA = LAt=Lt and do neither depend on the scale Lt of the
economy nor on population growth n. They are valid both for n = 0 and for n > 0.
9A similar negative dependency on g and T results for the simpler measure 1 ￿ ￿t=Yt = wY tLY t=Yt =
e
￿gTI(n;T)=I(n + g;T).
204.1 Optimal research intensity of the individual innovator
The market value of an innovation is the present value of the expected ￿ ow of quasi-pro￿ts generated
by the corresponding ￿nal good producer. Thus the individual research lab j at t chooses hj to







[Aj ￿ wY ￿]e￿r(￿￿t)d￿ ￿ wAthj;
where T(hj) is the length of time a ￿rm using Aj would be active on the good market and where
I have already assumed that interest rates are constant. Note that for su¢ ciently small hj, say for
0 < hj < hmin
t the technology Aj achieved by research hj is less e¢ cient than the least e¢ cient presently
active incumbent technology: Aj < A￿(t), where ￿(t) is the vintage of the oldest active ￿rm at t. An
intensity hj, with 0 < hj < hmin
t will never be chosen, since hiring researchers to come up with already
outdated techniques is not pro￿table (for hj > 0 and T(hj) = 0 pro￿ts ￿(hj) < ￿wAthj are negative).
Perfect competition on the goods markets leads to marginal product real wages wY ￿ = A￿(￿), where






[Aj ￿ A￿(￿)]e￿r(￿￿t)d￿ ￿ wAthj.








[Aj ￿ A￿(t+T(hj))]e￿rT(hj) = wAt.
Appendix 9.1 shows that the ￿rst order condition is su¢ cient if all other steady state equilibrium
conditions are satis￿ed. Since by de￿nition of ￿(￿) and T(hj), ￿(t + T(hj)) = t, the second term is







The intuition for this condition is straightforward: The present value from augmenting future revenues
(and pro￿ts) of the up-stream ￿nal output ￿rm by one unit in each active period (that is
R T(hj)
0 e￿r￿d￿)
multiplied by the number of such additional ￿nal output units per period realized by one additional
unit of research (that is dAj=dh) must exactly o⁄set the cost of this additional research.
At steady state with constant growth of labor e¢ ciency at rate g, (1) becomes Aj = f(hj) ￿
At
R 0






















Thus at (symmetric) steady state equilibrium with hj = ht = h, g = f(h) for all j and t the marginal
revenue condition for h is




where as before I(x;T) :=
R T
0 e￿xtd￿ = 1￿e￿xT
x (with 1￿e￿0T
0 = T) and where "(g) =
hf0(h)
f(h) is the
elasticity of the R&D production function with respect to h at h = f￿1(g).
4.2 Free entry to research and zero pro￿t for research-￿rms
As before the present value of future quasi pro￿ts expected by one innovator at t employing hj ￿ hmin
t
workers in research (assuming constant interest rate r) is
R t+T(hj)
t [Aj￿A￿(￿)]e￿r(￿￿t)d￿ ￿wAthj where
T(hj) ￿ 0 is the length of time the ￿rm plans to be active on the good market.
At equilibrium free entry to research requires these pro￿ts to be zero (which can also be interpreted














At steady state with constant lifetime (hence T(ht) = T = ￿ ￿￿(￿) for all ￿) and constant growth rate
g of labor e¢ ciency At the zero pro￿t and again using the notation I(x;T) :=
R T
0 e￿xtd￿ = 1￿e￿xT
x
(with 1￿e￿0T
0 = T), the ￿ marginal revenue condition￿from increasing ￿ becomes (see the Appendix for
the straightforward calculation)




The present value of the ￿nal-good output generated by an individual research lab (this is AtI(r;T))
reduced by the present value of future wage bills of the up-stream ￿nal good producer (Ate￿gTI(r ￿
g;T)) equals the wage bill of the research lab (wAtht).
Why do conditions (9) and (8) not depend directly on the size of the economy (L) nor on its
growth rate (n)? As has been explained in the introduction, the relevant features are that neither the
technology of the individual ￿nal-good producer nor the industrial wage wY t = e￿gTAt depend on L
or n.
224.3 Equal marginal present values
Comparison of the free-entry condition (9) with the optimal-research condition (8) shows that the
￿marginal present value￿from increasing ￿ must equal that from increasing h:
I(r;T) ￿ e￿gTI(r ￿ g;T) = I(r;T) ￿ "fh(g).
Thus, steady state equilibrium must satisfy




Lemma 1 At D = 0; the function D(g;r;T;") := (1 ￿ ")egT ￿
I(r￿g;T)
I(r;T) is strictly increasing in the
￿rst three variables and decreasing in ".
Proof. See Appendix 9.2.
Intuitively D rises with an increase of T because an increase of T raises the additional present value
of increasing ￿ more than that of increasing h. The ￿rst is increased in two ways: Increasing T raises
the pro￿table life-time and therefore the incentive to open a new research-lab and it reduces the future
wage-costs because the active ￿rm determining wages will be older when T is larger (e￿g￿ reduced for
￿ 2 (0;T)) . The ￿rst e⁄ect also raises the additional present value of increasing h, however it does
so to a weaker degree because the elastivity " of f is always smaller than one. The second e⁄ect (the
cost reducing e⁄ect) is irrelevant for the marginal present value of increasing h (see the ￿rst order
condition leading to 8). Thus the (normalized) di⁄erence between the two present values is raised.
Similarly an increase of g raises the additional present value of increasing ￿ more than that of
increasing h. In fact, an increase of g raises the marginal present value of increasing ￿ by the
mentioned cost-reduction e⁄ect (e￿g￿ reduced) while it reduces or (leaves unchanged) the marginal
present present value of h since "0(g) ￿ 0: Thus the (normalized) di⁄erence between the two marginal
values is raised.
Lemma 2 Corollary 3 (Equal Marginal Present Values) For every T > 0 the equilibrium condition
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Figure 5: Equalizing Marginal Present Values of h and ￿
5 Exogenous global R&D intensity
So far I have not speci￿ed how the quantities of resources used in the two sectors (￿nal-good and
knowledge-capital) are determined. The present section concentrates on the dimension of endogenous
growth which is speci￿c to the perfectly competitive model: The allocation of total research LAt
among competing research labs, determining the number ￿t = ￿Lt of competing research labs (and
hence the extent of future ￿nal good competition) and the research intensity h of each research ￿rm,
determining the rate f(h) of growth of new knowledge. To do so I ￿rst assume that there are two
distinct types of labor. The ￿rst is used only in the ￿nal good sector, the second is used only in the
research sector. The respective total supply shares, lY = LY t=Lt and lA = LAt=Lt, are exogenously
￿xed.
In Section 6 all workers will in principle capable to do both types of tasks, so that the allocation of
the total number of workers Lt = LY t+LAt among the two sectors (LY t and LAt) will be endogenous.
This adds the standard dimension of the research allocation problem.
In both sections I show that a steady state equilibrium exists and is unique.
5.1 Existence and uniqueness
Collecting the steady state equilibrium conditions from the previous sections provides the following
system of 6 equations with the 6 endogenous variables g, h, ￿, T, wAt=At and r (while lA, lY = 1￿lA,
24and n are exogenously given):
g = f(h) R&D-function
lY = ￿ ￿ I(n;T) manufacturing employment
lA = ￿ ￿ h R&D employment




I(r;T) ￿ e￿gT ￿ I(r ￿ g;T) =
wAt
At
h free entry to R&D
g = r ￿ ￿ Euler equation
Section 3 has reduced the ￿rst three equations to the falling function gMecha(T) (Equation 6). The
three last equations have lead to the increasing function gh￿￿(T) in Section 4 (Equation 11). Since
these two functions have a unique intersection we have shown:
Proposition 4 Existence and Uniqueness. The economy has a unique steady state equilibrium
with constant knowledge vintage lifetime T￿ and strictly positive productivity and per-capita income
growth rate g￿ = f(z ￿ I(n;T￿)).
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Figure 6: Steady-State REE with Exogenous Global R&D-Intensity
Of course, given g￿ and T￿ Section 3 determines unique steady state equilibrium values h(g￿),
￿￿ = lA=h(g￿), yt=At = ct=At = ￿￿I(g￿ + n;T￿), wY t=At = e￿g￿T￿
and r = g￿ + ￿. The wages for




The following comparative static results follow directly from Equation 6 and Equation 11 in Corol-
lary 3:
25Proposition 5 A rise of the of the research intensity lA = 1=[1 + (1=z)] ...
￿ ... raises the steady state equilibrium growth rate g￿,
￿ ... reduces the technology lifetime T￿,
￿ ... raises the individual research intensity h￿ = f￿1(g￿); and
￿ ... reduces the per-capita extent of entry ￿￿ = lA=h￿
A rise of the research e¢ ciency a or a decline of the discount rate ￿ ...
￿ ... raises the steady state equilibrium growth rate g￿,
￿ ... reduces the technology lifetime T￿,
￿ ... reduces the individual research intensity h￿ = zI(n;T￿), and
￿ ... raises the per-capita extent of entry ￿￿ = lY =I(n;T￿).
A decline of the discount rate ￿ ...
￿ ... raises the steady state equilibrium growth rate g￿,
￿ ... raises the technology lifetime T￿,
￿ ... raises the individual research intensity h￿ = f￿1(g￿); and
￿ ... reduces the per-capita extent of entry ￿￿ = lA=h￿
As in the ￿rst generation growth models and in contrast to the ￿ semi-endogenous￿growth models,
a policy that succeeds in increasing the research intensity lA has a positive growth e⁄ect. This always
goes hand in hand with a reduction of technology lifetime.
Furthermore, in contrast to the ￿ generation 98￿growth models, population size not only has no
e⁄ect on per capita income growth rates. It also has no e⁄ect on the level of per capita steady state
income. In this sense (and in contrast to these models) scale e⁄ects are absent in the present model:
Proposition 6 Population Size has no Growth-E⁄ect and no Level-E⁄ect. In the absence of
population growth a proportional variation of employment in the two sectors raises the extent of entry
￿￿ = L￿￿ by the same proportion and has no e⁄ect on the growth rate g￿ or on the per-labor-e¢ ciency
unit income level (Yt=AtLt)￿. Similarly, for n > 0, a proportional increase of the initial population
size (given z) has no e⁄ect on ￿￿, g￿ or (Yt=AtLt)￿.
The two R&D-equilibrium conditions do not depend on the size of the economy. As has been
explained the reasons for this are ￿rst that the e¢ cient scale size of the individual ￿nal-good producer
does not depend on the size of the market and second that each individual ￿nal-good producer has
to perform its own additional research to reach or improve upon the current knowledge frontier.
gMech(Tjz;n) does not depend on the size of the economy because the constancy of ￿￿=Lt at steady
state and the constant population growth rate make the employment equations of both sectors LAt
Lt =
￿t





Ltd￿ independent of Lt.
26However population still has an e⁄ect both on per capita income growth rates and levels through
its growth rate n:
Proposition 7 Exogenous total research intensity: Population Growth has negative Growth-
E⁄ect. An increase of population growth n ...
￿ reduces the steady state equilibrium growth rate g￿,
￿ raises the technology lifetime T￿,
￿ raises the individual research intensity h￿ = zI(n;T￿); and
￿ reduces the per-capita extent of entry ￿￿ = lY =I(n;T￿)
For reasons explained in Section 4 the R&D-equilibrium conditions do not depend on n. gMech(Tjz;n)






Lt d￿ = ￿
R t
t￿T e￿n(t￿￿)d￿
= ￿ ￿ I(n;T): An increase in n reduces the ratio of ￿rms of vintage ￿ < t to the number of man-
ufacturing workers at t. Therefore, given g, a larger number of vintages remains active to employ
lY = LY t=Lt workers per capita, the active lifetime of knowledge-capital increases. Increasing T for
given g, i.e. increasing the active lifetime of knowledge-capital raises the incentives to do research.
This allows more entry compatible with zero pro￿ts in the research sector: ￿ increases. Since lA = ￿h
is constant in the present section, h and hence g fall.
Note that the previous result hinges on the constancy of lY and lA. As we shall see in Section 6,
the e⁄ect of n on g will be neutralized by an endogenous adoption of z = lA=lY , while the e⁄ect of n
on levels remains.
These comparative statics are consistent with the negative empirical relation between growth and
technology lifetime observed by Habakkuk [1962], Williamson [1971], Temin [1966] or Hsieh [2001] if
one assumes that observed di⁄erences in (g;T) are due to di⁄erences of z, a or n:
Corollary 8 Negative relation between growth and technology lifetime. A variation of any
of the parameters z, a, and n (given the other parameters) induces a negative relation between g and
T:
Non-monotonic relation between growth and competition. Comp(g;T) depends negatively
on both g and T. We have seen that g and T are a⁄ected in opposite directions by changes in any of
the parameters z, a, or n. The net e⁄ect depends on which of the two e⁄ects dominates. In numerical
examples the relation between g and Comp generated by variations of any of the parameters was either
positive or non-monotonic.
275.2 Optimal steady state
Is the equilibrium blend of competition and growth optimal? Suppose a well-informed government
could choose the per-capita number ￿ of research ￿rms and their common size h.10 Is there a steady
state allocation of the given resources for research lA = ￿h leading to higher overall utility compared
to utility from the unique steady state equilibrium?
Final-good output and consumption is Ct = Yt = AtLY
1￿e￿￿(g)
￿(g) at any steady state, with ￿(g) =
T ￿ g = (1=z) ￿ h(g) ￿ g and where I assume n = 0 for simplicity. The government therefore chooses
























































Increasing g has a positive growth e⁄ect on W, measured by the corresponding increase @f W
@g = 1
￿ > 0.
At the same time increasing g decreases the extent of entry ￿, which has a negative level e⁄ect on
W, measured by the corresponding decrease of ln 1￿e￿￿(g)
￿(g) = lnYt=(AtLY ). Unsurprisingly, the growth
e⁄ect on utility is the more important the weaker consumers￿impatience ￿.
Proposition 9 The planner￿ s problem has a strictly positive solution gopt 2]0;1[. Depending on time
preference, the planner￿ s solution gopt may be smaller or larger than the equilibrium growth rate g￿.
Proof. See Appendix 9.4.
10Note that this government cannot overcome the barriers to knowledge of individual producers by simply publishing
the latest knowledge, be it because making the knowledge public is not su¢ cient for its application, be it because
knowledge is always embodied in some form of knowledge carrying rival capital (This is in particular satis￿ed if we
adhere to the embodied knowledge interpretation of Boldine and Levine). Thus private ￿nal good producers still have
to provide themselves with the knowledge-capital Aj needed to produce ￿nal output.
286 Endogenous global R&D intensity
So far the total number of researchers LAt or the research intensity lA = LAt=Lt were ￿xed exogenously.
The question was how many research labs were opened with these researchers or, equivalently, how
large each single research lab was. In this section total number of researchers LAt or the research
intensity lA are determined endogenously. It is now assumed that all workers are equally skilled to
perform any task in the economy.
On the one hand this adds as endogenous variable the research intensity lA (or the research ratio
z = lA=(1 ￿ lA) or lY = 1 ￿ lA) and also one additional equilibrium condition: At equilibrium, the
wages in both sectors are identical wAt=At = wY t=At = e￿gT. The system of steady state equilibrium
conditions (with the seven endogenous variables g, h, lA, ￿, T, wAt=At and r) now is:
g = f(h) R&D-function
1 ￿ lA = ￿ ￿ I(n;T) manufacturing employment
lA = ￿ ￿ h R&D employment
wAt
At
= e￿gT (equal wages)




I(r;T) ￿ e￿gT ￿ I(r ￿ g;T) =
wAt
At
h free entry to R&D
g = r ￿ ￿ Euler equation
Inserting the wage equality condition wAt=At = e￿gT, the inverse R&D-function h = h(g), and
the Euler equation into the two R&D equilibrium conditions (8) and (9) yields two equations in two
endogenous variables g and T alone:
I(g + ￿;T) ￿ egT = h(g)="(g) optimal h
I(g + ￿;T) ￿ egT = I(￿;T) + h(g) free entry to R&D





















which, taking into account the negative dependence of " on g; leads to the following proposition:
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Figure 7: Steady-State REE with Endogenous Global R&D-Intensity
Lemma 10 Endogenous Global Research Intensity: Equalizing wages de￿nes a positive relation be-























The function is strictly increasing in T with limT!0 gwY =wA(T) = gmin := maxf0;[1 ￿ (1=￿￿)]￿g and
limT!1 gwY =wA(T) = gmax < 1 de￿ned by h(gmax)[1="(gmax) ￿ 1] = 1=￿.
The positive relation between g and T induced by the global research allocation corresponds to the
negative relation between competition and growth in more standard endogenous growth models (with
exogenous intensity of competition ususally capture by an constant mark up of prices over marginal
costs): As we have seen, an increase of T (given g) increases future pro￿ts (reduces the intensity of
competition Comp(g;T)) which raises the incentives to enter and to increase h (note that the equality
of the two marginal present values has also been used in the derivation of 12), thus raises g.
Together with the negative relation between g and T from Lemma 3 the positive relation of Lemma
10 immediately yields the following
Proposition 11 The economy has a unique steady state equilibrium with constant knowledge vintage
lifetime T￿ and strictly positive productivity and per-capita income growth rate g￿ = gwY =wA(T￿).
Of course Equation (6) for gMecha(T) := f(z ￿I(n;T)) resulting from the steady-state employment
equations lY = ￿ ￿ I(n;T) and lA = ￿ ￿ h remains valid: However, the equation is no longer relevant
for the determination of the steady state equilibrium level of g or T! Given (g￿;T￿) Equation (6)
30determines z￿ = h(g￿)=I(n;T￿); l￿
A = 1=[1 + 1=z￿], ￿￿ = l￿
A=h(g￿). Total research employment is
L￿
At = Lt=[1 + 1=z￿], total manufacturing employment is L￿








Proposition 12 Endogenous total research: Size has no growth and no level e⁄ect. An increase
of the total labor force L0 leads to a proportional increase in the extent of entry without a⁄ecting per-
capita entry, the research intensity l￿
A, per-capita income growth g￿, or the steady-state level of per
labor e¢ ciency unit income (Yt=AtLt)￿.
Proposition 13 Endogenous total research: Negative e⁄ect of population growth on per-capita
income growth neutralized by positive e⁄ect on research intensity. An increase of the popu-
lation growth rate n ...
￿ ... has no in￿uence on g￿and T￿!
￿ ... raises the research ration z￿ =
f￿1(g￿)
I(n;T￿) and the global R&D-intensity l￿
A = 1
1+1=z￿
￿ ... raises the per-capita intensity of entry ￿￿ = l￿
A=h(g￿)
￿ ... reduces per labor-e¢ ciency unit income level (Yt=AtLt)￿




The reason behind the absence of any growth e⁄ect even of n is that now also the research wage
is determined by the marginal productivity of labor in manufacturing, which does not depend on the
size of the economy or its growth rate. Furthermore, as before, the two R&D equilibrium conditions
do not depend on n and L0: As has been explained this hinges on the assumptions that allow to
provide a sound non-cooperative foundation of perfect-competition in a world of endogenous technical
change: Individual ￿rms￿technologies exhibit small e¢ cient scales and each ￿nal-good producer has
to perform his own research (see Section 4).
Remember that in the economy with exogenous global research ratio z; an increase of n reduces g.
This is still relevant here, however, as we have just seen this e⁄ect is now neutralized by an endogenous
adoption of the employment ratio z! Thus: The negative growth e⁄ect of n is absorbed by its positive
e⁄ect on z￿! As a consequence also the R&D-share in total income is increased. In an environment of
increasing global resources that are useful for research one my therefore observe a constant per-capita
income growth rate despite an increasing R&D-share. This provides a solution to the "Jones-puzzel"
which allows to retain the possibility of fully endogenous growth.
Proposition 14 Research e¢ ciency has growth e⁄ects. A rise of the research e¢ ciency a
raises the steady state equilibrium growth rate g￿ and reduces the technology lifetime T￿.
31Thus as in Section 5 a variation of a induces negative relation between growth and tech-
nology lifetime (This is no longer as clear-cut as before for a variation of ￿, although in numerical
examples it remains true for ￿ as well). Furthermore the growth e⁄ect of a leaves room for growth
enhancing policy:
Growth enhancing policy A growth enhancing policy is a subsidy on research wages ￿nances by
a lump-sum tax. Suppose the government pays a subsidy of s < 1 output units for each output unit a
research ￿rm pays to its workers: the wage paid by a research ￿rm then is wAt = (1￿s)wworker
At , where
wworker
At is the wage received by the worker. Workers must be indi⁄erent between the two sectors, so
that wworker
At = wY t or wAt = (1 ￿ s)wY t. The relation wY t =
dYt(LY t)
dLY = Ate￿gT is neither a⁄ected
by the lump-sum tax nor by the research subsidy, so that wAt=At = (1 ￿ s)e￿gT. With the new
interpretation of wAt as net wage paid by research ￿rms condition (8) and (9) and thus condition
(10) remain unchanged. With wAt=At = (1 ￿ s)e￿gTconditions (optimal h) and (free entry) must be
rewritten to
"(g) ￿ I(r;T) = e￿gT(1 ￿ s)h(g) optimal h
I(r;T) ￿ e￿gT ￿ I(r ￿ g;T) = e￿gT(1 ￿ s)h(g) free entry to R&D
Already here one can see that reducing (1 ￿ s) has the same e⁄ect as increasing the R&D-subsidy s
has the same e⁄ect as increasing the research e¢ ciency a. Since the Euler-equation g = r ￿ ￿ too
remains una⁄ected by the lump-sum tax, we have
Theorem 15 A subsidy on research wages, ￿nanced by a lump-sum tax, increases the steady
state growth rate in the same way as an increase of the research e¢ ciency parameter a.
Thus despite the absence of scale e⁄ects, the present model is a model of endogenous growth not
only in the sense that growth occurs due to pro￿t-seeking R&D (as is also the case in ￿ semi-endogenous￿
growth models), but also in the sense that the growth rate can be a⁄ected by public policy (in contrast
to ￿ semi-endogenous￿growth models).
The scale of ￿nal-good producers So far the size of an individual ￿nal-good ￿rm of vintage ￿ was
normalized to one in the sense, that it employs one worker to produce A￿ units of output. To make
precise in what sense this was called a ￿ normalization￿ , I now assume that an individual ￿nal-good
￿rm produces ’A￿ units of output with ￿ workers.
In the Appendix 9.5 it is shown that the steady state equilibrium values g￿ and T￿ do not depend
on ’ and ￿more interestingly￿that g￿ and T￿ depend on ￿ in the same way as on 1=b: An increase of
32￿, i.e. the scale of individual ￿nal-good producers has the same e⁄ect on the steady state growth rate
as a proportional reduction of b = (1=a)1=￿, i.e. the number of workers needed to generate a given
g. In other words, the e⁄ect of an increase of ￿ on the growth rate is neutralized by a proportional
increase of b. The reason is that an increase of ￿ not only reduces a worker￿ s productivity in ￿nal-
good production but indirectly (that is through its e⁄ect on the ￿nal-good productivity) also that of
a researcher.
The employment ratio now is z￿ = (lA=lY )
￿ = h(g￿)=￿I(n;T￿) (since LY t = ￿￿LtI(n;T) and LAt =






the extent of entry is ￿￿ = l￿
A=h(g￿) = 1=[(1 + 1=z￿)h(g￿)] = 1=[h(g￿) + ￿T￿]. Thus
Theorem 16 An increase of the e¢ ciency parameter ’ of ￿nal-good technologies has no e⁄ect on the
steady state equilibrium values g￿ or T￿. A proportional increase of the scale ￿ of individual ￿nal-
good producers has the same positive e⁄ect on g￿ as a proportional increase of the research e¢ ciency
1=b = a1=￿. An increase of L0 leave unchanged g￿, T￿, the research-shares in total labor force and in
GDP and the extent of entry ￿￿. A proportional reduction of ￿ and b has the same e⁄ect except that
it induces a proportional increase of extent of entry ￿￿.
The corresponding results hold in the model of Section 5 with exogenous z = lA=lY . Here g￿ and
T￿ are determined by D(r;g;T;") = 0 and I(n;T) = (1=z)￿h(g).
7 Scale E⁄ects in previous growth models
As has already been emphasized, the conclusions concerning the e⁄ect of population size and growth
distinguish the present model from previous endogenous growth models:
Endogenous growth models with growth e⁄ect of size. The absence of any bu⁄er between the
growth rate and the total amount of research in the ￿rst generation of endogenous growth models
(Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpman [1991a,b], Aghion and Howitt [1992]) is responsible for the
unrealistic and much criticized growth e⁄ect of the sheer size of an economy: These models predict that
a permanent increase of the supply of resources that can be used for research leads to a proportional
permanent increase of per capita growth rate of output. This prediction is at odds with the time
series evidence of industrialized countries in the second half of the 20th century in the most developed
countries. For instance, the U.S. National Science Foundation (NSF 03-307, December 2002) reports
that the U.S. real expenditures in constant 1996 dollars has risen from less than 50 billions in 1953
to more than 250 billions in 2002. Contrary to the prediction of standard endogenous growth models,
the growth rate of real US per capita income has remained fairly constant.
33Semi-Endogenous Growth models with level e⁄ect of size. The strong scale e⁄ect of the ￿rst
generation of endogenous growth models has led some authors, notably Charles Jones in a series of
in￿ uential articles, to dismiss the assumption that a constant amount of labor devoted to innovat-
ing activity can generate a constant growth rate (Jones [1995a,b,2002] ], Kortum [1997], Segerstrom
[1998]). This assumption is crucial for the possibility of perpetual growth at constant rates in the ￿rst
generation growth models. In other words, in order to reconcile the observed increase of resources
allocated to research with the observed constant growth rates, these articles eliminate the possibility
of perpetually balanced growth. Growth is sustainable only in the presence of population growth.
A permanent increase of the population growth rate raises the long-run growth rate of per-capita
income! A related consequence is that it becomes harder to in￿ uence long-run growth rates. Even a
permanent subsidy of R&D for instance no longer enhances long-run growth. To emphasize the di¢ -
culty to in￿ uence the growth rate, Jones labels this class of models ￿ semi-endogenous￿ . As has been
noted, the present model gives an example of how to accommodate the increasing amount of research
resources observed in recent decades within an endogenous growth model that allows for perpetual
balanced growth without depending on always growing resources. In contrast to semi-endogenous
growth models, in the present model an R&D subsidy (￿nanced by a lump-sum tax) increases the
steady state income growth rate.
Endogenous growth models with level e⁄ect of size. The e⁄ect of size on the steady state growth
rate has previously been eliminated also in the two-dimensional endogenous growth models of Aghion
and Howitt [1998, Chapter 12], Dinopoulos and Thompson [1998], Peretto [1998], Young [1998]. These
￿ generation 98￿growth models add a second growth dimension to the ￿rst generation growth models:
Resources spent on research can either be used to increase the horizontally di⁄erentiated variety
of products or to increase the e¢ ciency with which existing varieties are produced. All of these
models are based on the horizontally di⁄erentiated commodity space ￿ la Spence [1976] and Dixit and
Stiglitz [1977]. Jones [1999] has already emphasized that each of these models involves scale e⁄ects:
An increase in the size of an economy increases its steady state per-capita income levels. The only
way to eliminate the e⁄ect of size on the growth rate in the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz based endogenous
growth models ￿apart from requiring a further knife-edge assumption (see Jones [1999] or Li [2002])
￿automatically adds a positive level e⁄ect of size and a positive growth e⁄ect of population growth.
These ￿ side e⁄ects￿of eliminating the growth e⁄ect of size are absent in the present paper.
The Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz version of competition is not only responsible for scale e⁄ects. It is
also at odds with some of the examples given to motivate the ￿ generation 98￿models or the real
phenomenon sometimes intended to be modelled. Young [1998] for instance ￿seeks to develop a model
that incorporates Gil￿llan￿ s principle of equivalent innovations￿ . The following quote from Gil￿llan
34[1935] is already used by Young [1998] to illustrate the concept of equivalent innovations:
￿ .... [I]n contraception we ￿nd 18 radically di⁄erent methods indicated in a recent book,
without counting minor variations. ... In marine history we recall numerous kinds of sails,
all for much the same result ... . [A] con￿guration of forces [can] call forth a number
of independent solutions by di⁄erent inventors about the same time, some identical and
others unlike, even utterly unlike, yet ￿lling the same need￿ .
In other words, ￿equivalent innovations￿ lead to products that are perfect substitutes for their
users! This corresponds to the version of competition assumed in the present paper. In contrast, in
the Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz version of competition, each additional competitor adds a new variety, which
lies at a strictly positive identical distance to all other varieties. In fact, Gil￿llan￿ s [1935] early and
ingenious vision of endogenous growth is more closely matched by the competitive endogenous growth
framework assumed in the present paper.
8 Scale e⁄ects: Inconclusive empirical evidence
What is the empirical evidence concerning the e⁄ect of population size and growth on per capita
income levels and growth? Kremer [1993] considers 5 ￿ continents￿that developed for more than 10,000
years in complete isolation from each other and notes that the initial population sizes show exactly the
same ranking as the per capita income growth rates during this period. This suggests that in the very
long-run, population size has (had) a positive e⁄ect on the growth rate of knowledge and of per capita
income. There is rather broad agreement about the absence of such a growth e⁄ect in more recent
times (see above). The same cannot be said about the e⁄ect of population size on the level of per
capita income and the e⁄ect of population growth on per capita income growth. A casual comparison
of current population growth rates and income levels in di⁄erent countries seems to reveal that the
e⁄ects of population growth rates on per-capita income levels are negative. For example, compare
countries like China or India (high population growth rates, low per capita income levels) with much
less fertile and richer countries like Japan of the US. Such comparisons point towards a negative level
e⁄ect of population growth as predicted by the present model. The empirical studies of Barro [1991],
Mankiw et.al.[1992], or Backus et.al. [1992] support this casual observation.
However, national di⁄erences concerning the legal, social, and political environment not explicitly
modeled by the above growth models may be responsible for this negative correlation. Several empirical
studies try to control for such national di⁄erences (see Jones [2003] for a summary). For instance,
Frankel and Romer [1999] and Alacala and Ciccone [2002] control for di⁄erences in international trade
and ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of population size on per-capita income levels. In contrast, Sala-I-Martin￿ s
35[1997] extensive cross country study shows no systematic e⁄ect of size on long-run per capita income.
In an econometrically re￿ned version Sala-I-Martin, Doppelhofer, and Miller￿ s [2004] ￿nd that out of
67 explanatory variables (including population size and growth rate) ￿18 are signi￿cantly and robustly
partially correlated with long-term growth and another three are marginally related.￿Population sizes
and the population growth rate are not signi￿cantly related to growth. Even the posterior means of
the estimated coe¢ cients conditional on inclusion of the population size is almost zero, while the
conditional mean for population growth is slightly positive if only 7 or 9 explanatory variables are
included but slightly negative when 11 or 16 variables are included! The conclusions from cross-section
studies concerning the e⁄ect of population size on per-capita income levels thus remain ambiguous.
More importantly, if ideas, commodities, and factors (including scientists) are internationally mo-
bile, it becomes unclear how these cross-country studies can test the predictions of any of the above
theoretical models. The fact that large numbers of Chinese or Indian engineers and scientists work
in US-research labs for instance indicates that the relevant pool of labor for R&D in the US is not
con￿ned to the US population.
Consider the following very stylized scenario, which pushes this idea to the extreme. There are two
groups of countries N and S, which are initially (before date 0) completely isolated. Before date 0 the
￿rst group of countries, N, has a no population growth 0:5%, a constant research intensity of 1% (ratio
of researchers to total labor) and constant per-capita income growth of gN = 2%. The second group
of countries, S, has before date 0 a constant population growth of 2% and constant per capita income.
Due to unfavorable institutional conditions no research is undertaken in S before date 0. Date 0 is the
day of globalization. From now on the world is integrated. National populations continue to grow at
previous rates. Institutional conditions in N remain as good as before, while they may improve in S
(this is not essential since researchers too are mobile). The relevant labor market for research ￿rms in
S and N now is the global economy.
What are the predictions of the diverse endogenous growth models about the post globalization
steady state variables in this example? The ￿rst generation of endogenous growth models predicts
exploding post globalization income growth rates. The semi-endogenous growth models as well as the
￿ generation 98￿endogenous growth models predict that the new global growth rate gG is larger than
the past growth rate gN of N. Instead, the competitive endogenous growth model predicts that the
new steady state growth rate gG of the global economy remains unchanged from the point of view of
N (gG = gN = 2%). Furthermore, the competitive model predicts that the new research intensity will
be larger than 1% and that the world-wide average per-labor-e¢ ciency unit income would be smaller
than the northern pre-globalization level.
Admittedly this scenario has been arranged to bring out favorably the predictions of the present
36model as compared with recent stylized facts: Not only the total amount of resources spent on R&D
and the total number of researchers world-wide and in particular in industrialized countries have
risen in the past 50 years, but ￿to a lesser extent ￿also the share of R&D expenditures in total
expenditures and the share of researchers in the total labor force. Thus per-capita income growth
rates have remained more or less constant, despite an increasing research share in GDP and increasing
research intensity.
Considering current empirical evidence, it seems unwarranted to exclusively bid on models in which
continuous per capita income growth depends on continuous population growth or/and on models that
are ￿ inextricably tied to scale e⁄ects￿ . This paper shows that from a theoretical point of view this
specialization is not necessary: Endogenous growth without scale e⁄ects is possible and does not
require population growth.
9 Appendix
9.1 Appendix. Optimal Individual Research Intensity




















since by de￿nition of ￿(￿) and T(hj) the term Aj ￿ A￿(t+T(hj)) = 0 for any choice of Aj by j at t:
Technology Aj ceases to be active (by de￿nition at t + T(hj) ) exactly when the wages w￿ will be
determined by Aj.
Su¢ ciency of the ￿rst order condition I show su¢ ciency of the ￿rst order condition already
using the fact that at steady state equilibrium all (other) ￿rms are determining the constant steady
state variables h, g, and T. The lifespan T(hj) of ￿rm j (deviating at t) is determined by the condition,
that j becomes inactive when its technology Aj matches the least e¢ cient non-deviating incumbents￿
technology, i.e. by the condition Aj = At+T(hj)￿T = eg(T(hj)￿T)At. With Aj=At = f(hj)=f(h) this is
f(hj) = geg(T(hj)￿T) or




Note that this condition also determines the hmin
t = f￿1(ge￿gT). Furthermore j￿ s lifetime is limited
by the upper bound limhj!1 T(hj) = T +
ln(1=g)
g . Given that all other ￿rms choose their steady state

















































1 ￿ e￿rT (f(hj)=g)
￿r=g
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c1f(hj) + c2f(hj)￿c3 ￿ c4hj ￿ c5
￿
;








e￿rT;c3 = (r ￿ g)=g = ￿=g;c4 = wAt=At
and c5 = [1=(r ￿ g)]e￿gT = [1=￿]e￿gT are strictly positive numbers, which are exogenously given
for the individual research lab j. The research lab j thus chooses hj ￿ hmin
t to maximize e ￿(hj) :=
[c1f(hj) + c2f(hj)￿c3 ￿ c4hj ￿ c5]. First consider the function ￿(hj) := c1f(hj) + c2f(hj)￿c3 on the






is strictly increasing from ￿1 (when hj ! 0) to c1 > 0 (when hj ! 1) and
is zero for a unique hj, say h1. Thus ￿0(hj) < 0 for hj < h1 and ￿0(hj) > 0 for hj > h1 and with
￿0(h1) = 0 too, since f0(hj) > 0. Furthermore limhj!￿ ￿0(hj) = 0 since limhj!￿ f0(hj) = 0: The ￿rst
derivative ￿0(hj) has a unique maximum at some hj > h1, say h2 with ￿00(h2) = 0. Since c4 > 0 the








function ￿0(hj) ￿ c4 therefore takes zero value exactly twice if ￿0(h1) > c4, once if ￿0(h1) = c4 and
nowhere if ￿0(h1) < c4. We can exclude the latter case because e ￿0(hj) = ￿0(hj) ￿ c4 = 0 has at least
38one solution hj = h since by construction at steady state all innovators satisfy the ￿rst order condition.
The case that ￿(hj)￿c4hj has only one interior extremum is also excluded since e ￿ would be everywhere
strictly decreasing except at h1 which contradicts e ￿(hmin
t ) = ￿(wAt=At)hmin
t < 0 = e ￿(hj = h) since
T > 0; thus h > hmin
t . Thus ￿(hj)￿c4hj has two local extrema. The ￿rst (which lies between h1 and
h2) must be a local minimum of ￿(hj)￿c4hj and hence of e ￿(hj) and the second (which is larger than
h2) must be a local maximum. Because limhj!1 f(hj)￿c3 = 1 the same holds for ￿(hj) and e ￿(hj).
Furthermore limhj!1 ￿(hj) = limhj!1 e ￿(hj) = ￿1 because f(hj) is bounded and c4 > 0. Therefore
e ￿(hj) is strictly positive for hj small, ￿rst falls to attain a local minimum, than rises to reach a local
maximum and ￿nally falls with increasing hj.







Figure 9: for hj ￿ hmin > 0, e ￿(hj) is the individual innovator￿ s pro￿t function at steady state
equilibrium
Remember that e ￿(hj) is not relevant for j￿ s maximization for hj < hmin
t . We know that e ￿(hmin
t ) =
￿(wAt=At)hmin
t < 0. Therefore at its local minimum e ￿ must be negative too. Furthermore we know
that at steady state equilibrium ￿(hj) = ￿(h) = 0 so that the ￿rst order condition used to determine
the steady state must in fact correspond to the local maximum of e ￿(hj) which is a global maximum
on the allowed domain (hmin
t ;1).
399.2 Appendix. Free Entry
The free entree condition is
Z t+T
t




































Proof of Lemma 1
1. Both integrals I(r￿g;T) and I(r;T) decrease with the interest rate r. However I(r￿g;T) decreases
faster than I(r;T), as the ￿ discount rate￿r￿g is always smaller than the ￿ discount rate￿r (for g > 0).
Therefore ￿I(r ￿ g;T)=I(r;T) and hence D are increasing in r, whenever g > 0:















[I(r;T)]2 at D = 0. Substituting (1 ￿ ")egT by
I(r￿g;T)
I(r;T) and dividing both sides of the inequality by
I(r￿g;T)











































. The second term in parentheses is always positive for
r > 0, since T < erT￿1
r =
R T



















r￿g or T > 1￿e
￿(r￿g)T
r￿g = I(r ￿ g;T).











at D = 0. Substituting
(1 ￿ ")egT by
I(r￿g;T)
I(r;T) and dividing both sides by
I(r￿g;T)












. Multiplying both sides with (e(r￿g)T￿1)(erT￿1); this becomes ge(r￿g)T(erT￿1) >
(<)re(r￿g)T(egT￿1) or erT￿1
r > (<)egT￿1
g if r￿g > (<)0. This is equivalent to
R T
0 er￿d￿ > (<)
R T
0 eg￿d￿
if r > (<)g, which is always satis￿ed.
Proof of Lemma 10
First note that D < 0 for "(g) = ￿￿(1￿g1=￿) ￿ 1 D(g;g+￿;T;"(g)) = [1￿"(g)]egT￿
I(￿;T)
I(￿+g;T) < 0 for all
T, so that D = 0 has no solution for g < gmin := maxf0;[1￿(1=￿￿)]￿g. For limg!
>
gmin D = ￿
I(￿;T)
I(￿+g;T) <
￿1. For limg!1 D = eT ￿
I(￿;T)
I(1+￿;T) > 0 if eTI(1 + ￿;T) ￿ I(￿;T) > 0 or if eT￿e￿￿T
1+￿ ￿ 1￿e￿￿T
￿ > 0 or if





0 which is always satis￿ed since e￿ > 1 > e￿￿￿ for all ￿ > 0. Thus D = 0 has a solution.
9.4 Appendix. Fixed Total Research.





I(￿;1) , where ￿(g) = 1














limg!0 "hg(g) = ￿￿, limg!0 h(g) = 0, therefore limg!0 ￿0 = 0. limg!0 ￿(g) = 0, limg!0 I(￿;1) = 1,
limg!0
dI(￿;1)
dg < 0. Hence limg!0
df W
dg = 1
￿ > 0. Furthermore limg!0 f W = 0, limg!1
df W
dg = ￿1 and
limg!1 f W = ￿1. Thus, f W is positive and increasing for su¢ ciently small positive g and is strictly
negative and decreasing for g su¢ ciently close to 1. Therefore f W has a maximum gopt 2]0;1[. Note:
U(g) may have two local maxima.
Consider the numerical example ￿ = 1=11, ￿ = 25, b = 1=2, z = LA=LB = 5%. The equilibrium
growth rate is g￿ ’ 2:2209% if the time preference is ￿ = 2% and is g￿ ’ 2:027%, thus slightly smaller,
if consumers are much more impatient, with ￿ = 4% With ￿ = 2% the (unique) optimal rate is larger
than the equilibrium rate gopt ’ 2:227 > g￿, while it is smaller for ￿ = 2%: gopt ’ 2 < g￿. While gopt
and g￿ decline with rising impatience ￿, the optimal rate is declines by more.
Similarly ￿ = 1=6, ￿ = 38, b = 1=2, z = LA=LB = 5%. For ￿ = 1% we have gopt ’ 1:1615 > g￿ ’
1:1565 (T￿ ’ 10:62 years and r￿ ’ 2:57% ). For ￿ = 2% we have gopt ’ 1:1525 < g￿ ’ 1:1563
(T￿ ’ 10:04 years and r￿ ’ 3:5% ). For ￿ = 4% we have gopt ’ 1:45 < g￿ ’ 1:156 (T￿ ’ 9:799 years
and r￿ ’ 5:56%).
9.5 Appendix: Endogenous Research Intensity
Proof of Theorem 16. The present value of the rents accruing to an innovator now are
R t+T(hj)
t [’Aj￿
￿wY ￿]e￿r(￿￿t)d￿ ￿ wAthj: With wY ￿ = (’=￿)A￿(￿) this becomes
R t+T(hj)
t ’[Aj ￿ A￿(￿)]e￿r(￿￿t)d￿ ￿
wAthj: Conditions (8) and (9) become I(r;T) ￿ "(g) = wAt
At
h




Thus, the Condition D(r;g;T;") := (1 ￿ ")egT ￿
I(r￿g;T)
I(r;T) = 0 remains valid and does not depend on
’ or ￿. In the model with endogenous research intensity the second equilibrium condition becomes
T(r;g;b=￿;￿;￿) =
￿lnf1￿(r￿g)[h(g)=￿][1="(g)￿1])g






￿ e￿gT) and as before (8) and (9). Thus the steady state equilibrium values g￿
and T￿ do not depend on ’. Obviously a variation of ’ has the same e⁄ect as one of A0. Furthermore
g￿ and T￿ depend on ￿ in the same way as on 1=b.
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